

J.C.S. 1907/269

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31 May 1960Pages 1744 - 1746, incl.NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (U)Reference: J.C.S. 1907/266 - 9172 *Berlin/9105*
(28 Mar 60)

The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
CSAM 183-60, dated 27 May 1960, is circulated for information.

H. L. HILLYARD,

F. J. BLOUIN,

Joint Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

INITIAL ACTIONS IN A PROGRESSIVE MOBILIZATION FOLLOWING
A PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY IN
THE BERLIN CRISIS (S)

CSAM 183-60

27 May 1960

1. J.C.S. 1907/266 states in the last sentence of paragraph 2a, Enclosure "A", that "The military measures should include, on a progressive basis, increased alert, unit deployments or dispersal, and use of emergency powers of the President to effect an appropriate degree of mobilization" (underlining added). The purpose of this memorandum is to furnish for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff those Army mobilization measures envisaged for progressive implementation in current Department of the Army plans after Presidential declaration of a national emergency.

2. Current Army mobilization planning is based on the priorities assigned the various reserve component units. Briefly, the more important high priority actions for the Berlin situation, in chronological order, would be:

a. National Guard CONUS on-site air defense units would be called to active duty. This can be explained to the world as a purely defensive action, but would, of course, increase our capabilities in air defense as well as be an indication of our firmness of intent to defend the free world and stand on our rights in Berlin.

b. Trained individual fillers and mobilization designees would be recalled to active duty. These personnel would bring active Army units and staffs to full strength with trained men, increase the combat readiness of these units, and be a further indication of our firmness.

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Enclosure

c. Reserve component units to round-out the active Army would be called into active service. These reserve component units include combat, logistical and administrative units to provide the balanced forces necessary for later deployment when and if required. These are not large units such as divisions but their mobilization would be a strong indicator to the Soviets of the firmness of our intent.

d. Staging area units, reception stations, Army garrisons and training centers would be called to active duty to prepare the ground for further mobilization if required.

e. Finally, if the situation so dictated, the division forces of the Ready Reserve would be called to active duty. Dependent again on the situation, the number of divisions in the first call might vary from a one division balanced force to the entire Ready Reserve STRAF--a balanced six division force.

3. The above actions could, of course, be taken concurrently. In conjunction with these actions an increase in Selective Service call would also be necessary. But it should be noted that not any of these actions have necessarily involved the overseas deployment of any additional units--they pertain only to MOBILIZATION to increase our readiness progressively, as well as to show increasing firmness of our intent.

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Enclosure